Fisicalismo e o Mistério da Consciência Fenomenal

Maria Clara Dias


Phenomenal properties are commonly considered as a special kind of
entities because of their peculiar features, such as privacy, perspectivity
and necessary ownership to the individual. Such sui generis properties are
not easily accommodated in a physicalist framework, since physical objects
and properties do not have such features, and it is difficult to conceive
any physical entity in terms of these sui generis properties. In this
regard, this paper aims to: (1) deal with the difficulty to conciliate
phenomenal properties and physicalism; (2) consider the solutions proposed
by Michael Tye to this problem; and (3) revisit the knowledge argument in
the light of Tye’s PANIC theory. I conclude this paper by comparing Tye’s
proposal with the distintion between reflexive and referential content,
proposed by John Perry.

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