In Carnap’s Defense: A survey on the concept of a linguistic framework in Carnap’s philosophy

Parzhad Torfehnezhad

Abstract


The main task in this paper is to detail and investigate Carnap’s conception of a “linguistic framework”(LF). On this basis, we will see whether Carnap’s dichotomies, such as the analytic-synthetic distinction, are to be construed as absolute/fundamental dichotomies or merely as relative dichotomies. I argue for a novel interpretation of Carnap’s conception of a LF and, on that basis, will show that, according to Carnap, all the dichotomies to be discussed are relative dichotomies; they depend on conventional decisions concerning the logical syntax of LF. Thus, all of the dichotomies directly hinge on the conception of the LF. The LF’s logical structure, in turn, is an immediate consequence of adopting the linguistic doctrine of logical truths. As we will see, no appeal to any of these distinctions is necessary in establishing a LF and all of its components. I will also draw attention to the differences between what Carnap labels a “way of speaking”, “language”, and “artificial language”. Consequently, I will briefly conclude that none of Quine’s major objections address the main points of Carnap’s theory.

Keywords


logical syntax; linguistic framework; levels of abstraction; Carnap; Quine; analytic-synthetic distinction

References


Akiba, K. (1995). Quine and the Linguistic Doctrine of Logical Truth. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 78(3), pp. 237-256.

Arnold, J., & Shapiro, S. (2007). Where in the (World Wide) Web of Belief Is the Law of Non-Contradiction? Noûs, 41(2), 276-276-297.

Awodey, S. (2007). Carnap's Quest for Analyticity: The 'Studies in Semantics' (pp. 226-226-247): Cambridge Univ Pr.

Berge, W. H. (1995). Carnap and Translational Indeterminacy. Synthese, 105, 115-121.

Bird, G. (1995). Carnap and Quine: Internal And External Questions. Erkenntnis, 42, 41-64.

Burgess, J. P. (2004). Quine, Analyticity and Philosophy of Mathematics. The Philosophical Quarterly, 54(214), pp. 38-55.

Carnap, R. (1936). Testability and Meaning. Philosophy of Science, 3(4), pp. 419-471.

Carnap, R. (1937). The logical syntax of language. London: Routledge & K. Paul.

Carnap, R. (1938). Empiricism and the Language of Science. Synthese, 3(12), pp. 33-35.

Carnap, R. (1939). Foundations of logic and mathematics (Vol. 1, no. 3). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Carnap, R. (1942). Introduction to semantics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Carnap, R. (1950). Empiricism, semantics, and ontology. Revue Internationale De Philosophie, 20-40.

Carnap, R. (1955a). Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 6(3), pp. 33-47.

Carnap, R. (1955b). On Some Concepts of Pragmatics. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 6(6), pp. 89-91.

Carnap, R. (1956). Meaning and necessity;a study in semantics and modal logic (Vol. 2d , enl] --). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Carnap, R. (1959). Introduction to Semantics and Formalization of Logic. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Carnap, R. (1967). The logical structure of the world [and] Pseudoproblems in philosophy (2 ed.). London: Routledge K. Paul.

Carnap, R. (1973). Notes on Probability and Induction. Synthese, 25(3/4), 269-298.

Carnap, R. (1994). Science and Analysis of Language. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, 2, 291-291-294.

Creath, R. (1991). Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Quine-Carnap Correspondence and Related Work: Univ of Calif Pr.

Dilman, I. (1970). Wittgenstein, Philosophy and Logic. Analysis, 33-42.

Friedman, M. (1999). Reconsidering Logical Positivism: Cambridge University Press.

Friedman, M. (2000). A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger: Open Court.

Friedman, M. (2009). Carnap on Theoretical Terms: Structuralism without Metaphysics. Paper presented at the Theoretical Frameworks and Empirical Underdetermination Workshop, Düsseldorf.

Friedman, M., & Creath, R. (2007). The Cambridge companion to Carnap. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gabriel, G., Hermes, H., Kambartel, F., Thiel, C., & Veraart, A. (1980). Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondance (P. Long & R. White, Trans.): Basil Blackwell.

George, A. (2000). On Washing the Fur without Wetting It: Quine, Carnap, and Analyticity. Mind, 109(433), 1-24.

Grice, H. P. S., P. F. . (1956). In Defense of a Dogma. The Philosophical Review, 65(2), 141-158.

Haack, S. (1993). The Two Faces of Quine's Naturalism. Synthese, 94(3), pp. 335-356.

Hempel, C. G. (1973). Rudolf Carnap, Logical Empiricist. Synthese, 25(3/4, In Honor of Rudolf Carnap), pp. 256-268.

Hillier, S. (2009). Mathematics in Science: Carnap versus Quine. History of Philosophy Quarterly, 26(4).

Hintikka, J. (1992). Carnap's Work in the Foundations of Logic and Mathematics in a Historical Perspective. Synthese, 93, 167-189

.

Koellner, P. Carnap on the Foundations of Logic and Mathematics. Retrieved 2012

Lavers, G. (2012). On the Quinean-analyticity of mathematical propositions. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 195(2), 299.

Maddy, P. (2007). Second Philosophy: A naturalistic method. New York: Oxford University Press.

McDermott, M. (2001). Quine's Holism and Functionalist Holism. Mind, 110(440), pp. 977-1025.

O'Grady, P. (1999). Carnap and Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59(4), 1015-1027.

Oberdan, T. J. (1992). The Concept of Truth in Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language. Synthese: An International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, 93(1-2), 239-239-260.

Peacock, H. (2011). Two Kinds of Ontological Commitment. Philosophical Quarterly, 61(242), 79-104.

Price, H. (1997). Carnap, Quine and the Fate of Metaphysics. The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy.

Price, H. (2009). Metaphysics after Carnap: The Ghost Who Walks? (pp. 320-320-346): Clarendon Press.

Psillos, S. (2000). Carnap, the Ramsey-Sentence and Realistic Empiricism. Erkenntnis, 52(2), 253-279.

Psillos, S. (2000). Rudolf Carnap’s ‘Theoretical Concepts in Science’. Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., 31(1), 151-172.

Quine, W. V. (1951). ON CARNAP'S VIEWS ON ONTOLOGY. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 2, 65-65-72.

Quine, W. V. (1960). CARNAP AND LOGICAL TRUTH. Synthese: An International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, 12, 350-350-374.

Quine, W. V., & Ullian, J. S. (1978). The web of belief (2 ed.). New York: Random House.

Quine, W. V. O. (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. The Philosophical Review, 20-43.

Quine, W. V. O. (1951a). On Carnap's Views on Ontology. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 65-72.

Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Carnap and Logical Truth. Synthese: An International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, 350-374.

Richardson, A. (2007). Carnapian Pragmatism (pp. 295-295-315): Cambridge Univ Pr.

Richardson, A. W. (2003). Rudolf Carnap (pp. 27-27-42): Gale Group/Thomson Learning.

Runggaldier, E. (1984). Carnap's Early Conventionalism: An Inquiry into the Historical Background of the Vienna Circle: Editions Rodopi

Schilpp, P. A. (1963). The philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (Vol. 11). La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.

Soames, S. (2009). Ontology, Analyticity, and Meaning: The Quine-Carnap Dispute (pp. 424-424-443): Clarendon Press.

Sober, E., & Hylton, P. (2000). Quine. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 74, pp. 237-299.

Stein, H. (1989). Yes, but.. Some Skeptical Remarks on Realism and Anti-Realism. Dialectica, 43(1-2), 47-65.

Tsou, J. Y. (2003). The Justification of Concepts in Carnap's Aufbau. Philosophy of Science, 70(4), 671-689.

Wittgenstein, L. (1958). Philosophical investigations. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.

Yablo, S. (1998). Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? I. Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume, Supp(72), 229-229-261.

Zalta, E. N. (2014). Ludwig Wittgenstein The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.


Full Text: PDF

Refbacks

  • There are currently no refbacks.