Explicação e Causação

Wilson Mendonça

Abstract


The paper argues against the current view according to which there
is a clear dichotomy between causation and explanation. The first is usually
conceived as an extensional relation connecting particulars individuated
non-intentionally, while the second would concern only rational, intensional
links between true propositions (facts). Close examination of the
particularistic strategy employed to account for the way causal explanation
depends ontologically on causation shows that it fails in at least two
cases: (i) explanations involving negative facts and (ii) explanations by
stative predications. This also reveals that the usual assumption of
token-states as a new type of particular causes designated by the
nominalization of the sentential expression of stative facts is not
independently motivated. Moreover it goes against the plausible distinction
between enabling conditions and triggering causes. The paper closes with the
claim that facts can be genuine causes and effects.

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