The following three graduate student articles were selected from among nineteen first-rate presentations which were presented during the “Second European Graduate School: Philosophy of Language, Mind and Science”, organized at Ruhr-University Bochum and the University of Lausanne in March 2009. We received fifty high quality graduate submissions from students of European as well as overseas universities. The submissions were without exception subjected to a double-blind review process, and we would like to take this opportunity to thank all our colleagues for their valuable assistance in this time-consuming reviewing process.

The Graduate School was the result of a collaboration financed by a DAAD program between the philosophy departments at Bochum (Germany), Lausanne (Switzerland) and Tilburg (The Netherlands), who had decided to coordinate their graduate education in philosophy of language, mind and science. To this end, two week-long meetings were organized in order to allow selected graduate students to present and discuss their ongoing research projects. Each week focused on one main topic, which was discussed in extended tutorials by the two keynote speakers. A one-day international workshop with several invited speakers rounded off each week’s program.

The first of these two weeks took place in Bochum and dealt with the topic “Self, Person, and Action”. This part of the workshop was combined with the Carnap Lectures, an event taking place annually since 2008 at Ruhr-University Bochum. This year’s lectures were given by John Perry (Stanford University), who focused on several aspects of the self. François Recanati (Institut Jean Nicod, Paris), our main speaker for the Graduate School, discussed central aspects of context-dependency. We would like to thank John and François, but also the graduate students and other international speakers participating in the
workshop for stimulating discussions, which took place in an informal and cheerful atmosphere.

The second week in Lausanne was centered on the topic “The Philosophy of Perception”, with Tim Crane (University of Cambridge) and Michael Tye (University of Texas at Austin) as keynote speakers. Both gave several lectures that dealt with hotly debated issues in the philosophy of mind and perception. We would like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to Michael and Tim for their stimulating talks as well as for the ensuing discussions that took place in a very friendly atmosphere to the great benefit of all participants. In addition, we should also like to thank the invited speakers who presented talks during the Graduate School’s closing workshop. They all contributed significantly to the success of the Lausanne week, making this a memorable event.

This two-week long event marked the second instalment of a program of three European Graduate Schools. The third meeting will take place in Lausanne and Tilburg in October 2010, and we are confident that it will be just as successful as its two predecessors.

The selected papers offer inventive proposals on three quite diverse issues. 1. How to conceive of semantic reference in natural languages? 2. What are the prospects for an intentionalist theory of self-deception? 3. What account of perceptual consciousness do synaesthetic experiences call for?

As to the first paper, Jessica Pepp (University of California, Los Angeles) compares two conceptions of semantic reference. The conventional conception is contrasted with what is coined the historical conception of semantic reference. It is argued that the two conceptions are both ways of conceiving of semantic reference, and that the historical conception is more viable as a basis for the semantics of natural language than the conventional conception. The paper finishes by drawing a distinction between a theory of semantic reference and the historical conception of semantic reference, describing the latter as setting the stage for the former.

The second paper dwells upon the claim that most or all self-deceptions depend on intentional self-deception. Kevin Lynch (Warwick University) argues that intentional models of self-deception can partly be traced to a particular invalid method for analyzing reflexive expressions of the form ‘Ving oneself’ (where V stands for a verb). In addition, it
is argued that the best prospects for an intentionalist theory of self-deception lie with a strategy involving the control of attention.

Finally, the third paper by Michael Sollberger (University of Lausanne) addresses the issue of what an indirect realist theory of perception should look like. More precisely, the goal of his article is to prompt a new view of perceptual consciousness that is ruthlessly structural. To this end, he combines the structural approach to representation with an original discussion of empirical cases of synaesthesia. He challenges our intuitions by arguing that there are good reasons to conceive of some synaesthetic experiences not as illusory or hallucinatory, but as truly veridical perceptions. In addition, he highlights in his contribution how synaesthetic experiences are well-suited to corroborating a structural account of the perceptual mind.

Last but not least, special thanks are due to the editors of ABSTRACTA, who enabled us to make the outstanding graduate papers assembled in this volume accessible for a wide range of readers.

Albert Newen

Ruhr-Universität Bochum
albert.newen@rub.de

Raphael van Riel

Ruhr-Universität Bochum
raphael.vanriel@rub.de

Michael Sollberger

Université de Lausanne
michael.sollberger.2@unil.ch